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I've spent more than three decades studying, planning for, and fighting in wars—starting as an enlisted Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) technician, rising through the ranks countering terrorism in bomb disposal assignments, then commissioning and leading as a bomber squadron commander in combat during the Global War on Terror, vice commander of America’s only airborne intelligence wing after graduating from the Naval War College, and commander of a wing operating a high value strategic installation. I’ve commanded bomber crews dropping bombs on tyrants and terrorists from B-1s, authored theater nuclear war plans, and advised at the highest levels on strategic deterrence and building the global war on terror campaign plan. So when I talk air and naval power, I have a strong foundation of direct experience in planning and execution from global to regional war.
Back in the early days of Operation Epic Fury, I was skeptical but positive. Like many of my friends and colleagues, I’ve been scarred by the wrong wars—Iraq and Afghanistan—where we poured in ground troops, nation-built, and got bogged down in endless occupations. Those experiences convinced me that “you can’t win without boots on the ground and a full scale ground invasion” was the hard lesson of modern conflict. I got away from my original air and naval power theory roots, the ones drilled into me from the masters: Alfred Thayer Mahan’s strategic tenets of sea power, Curtis LeMay’s overwhelming strategic bombing, John Boyd’s OODA loop dominance, and John Warden’s five-ring targeting that collapses enemy systems from the center out. I let the quagmires cloud my judgment.
When President Trump and our Israeli allies launched this air and naval campaign on February 28—no invasion, no occupation force—I started cautious. Tactical success? Sure, we’d hammer their missiles, navy, and nuclear sites. But regime change? Toppling the mullahs without American divisions in Tehran? I pegged full strategic victory at maybe 20–30%. The regime had survived everything for 47 years. Their Basij and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp would just crush any uprising.
Then the campaign evolved, and I had to reevaluate the lens I see things through.
The real turning point was the deliberate, ferocious targeting of the Basij—the regime’s internal enforcers, the ones who beat down protests and keep the people in chains. This wasn’t incidental; it is a major phase, gutting their leadership (like Basij commander Major General Gholamreza Soleimani taken out in recent Israeli strikes), checkpoints, compounds, and urban control nodes. When you dismantle the very force that suppresses opposition from the air, you create the vacuum for the Iranian people to rise up. That shifted my assessment hard—overall probability of success, including internal regime collapse without boots, jumped to around 48%. The anti-Basij effort proved you could erode the regime’s domestic grip without a ground invasion.
But there is a serious potential for the powerful addition of limited special operations forces—small teams of Delta, SEALs, Green Berets, and our Israeli partners. Not an invasion force, just dozens to low hundreds of operators potentially training, arming, and coordinating indigenous resistance, feeding targets, and protecting the spark if it ignites. That’s straight out of Boyd and Warden: multiply effects, accelerate the OODA loop for the good guys. If incorporated effectively, my numbers would climb again to about 71%. We wouldn’t just be hoping anymore—we’d be enabling a collapse from within.
And if we incorporate the potential for a limited amphibious operation—like the 31st MEU aboard USS Tripoli seizing and holding Kharg Island (Iran’s oil export lifeline, handling ~90% of their revenue) and possibly key islands in the Strait of Hormuz—the math gets even stronger. These moves would deliver crushing economic strangulation overnight: no hard currency, no pay for IRGC/Basij goons, accelerated hardship and defections. It fits perfectly—no mainland occupation, just key terrain denial that starves the beast and removes the threat to the global economy. If executed, it would push the overall probability of full strategic success—military objectives plus regime change from within—into the 78–88% range, central estimate around 83%. That’s LeMay-level decisive, Warden-style systemic collapse, and Mahan’s primary role of the Navy of protecting commerce in real life, without repeating the mistakes of Iraq or Afghanistan.
We are seeing air and naval power, executed with precision and potentially integrated with surgical SOF, prove the skeptics wrong—including this old bomber commander who started out doubting. The mullahs are bleeding leadership, control, and potentially cash. The Iranian people are smelling freedom. And we’re doing it without a trillion-dollar quagmire or American boots marching across Iran.
This operation is correcting the book on warfare. It’s validating the airpower and naval power theories I drifted from after the disastrous ground wars. Curtis LeMay would recognize the overwhelming force. John Boyd would applaud the tempo and adaptation collapsing the Iranian Mosaic Defense. John Warden would nod at the targeting of leadership, internal security, and economic systems and networks. Mahan would be thrilled at the skillful destruction of the Iranian navy no matter where its vessels are and reestablishment of our naval supremacy anywhere and anytime.
America is winning. Our warriors are executing brilliantly. And the era of “you can’t win without boots on the ground in a full-scale invasion” is being retired—right here, right now.
Let’s stay the course. The Iranian people deserve liberation. Our nation deserves victory. And history will remember this as the moment air and naval power, done right, changed the world.
Rob Maness is a retired U.S. Air Force Colonel, former enlisted EOD technician, bomber squadron commander in combat, a former U.S. Senate candidate, and America First national security voice.
https://x.com/RobManess/status/2034749268993409375
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I've spent more than three decades studying, planning for, and fighting in wars—starting as an enlisted Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) technician, rising through the ranks countering terrorism in bomb disposal assignments, then commissioning and leading as a bomber squadron commander in combat during the Global War on Terror, vice commander of America’s only airborne intelligence wing after graduating from the Naval War College, and commander of a wing operating a high value strategic installation. I’ve commanded bomber crews dropping bombs on tyrants and terrorists from B-1s, authored theater nuclear war plans, and advised at the highest levels on strategic deterrence and building the global war on terror campaign plan. So when I talk air and naval power, I have a strong foundation of direct experience in planning and execution from global to regional war.
Back in the early days of Operation Epic Fury, I was skeptical but positive. Like many of my friends and colleagues, I’ve been scarred by the wrong wars—Iraq and Afghanistan—where we poured in ground troops, nation-built, and got bogged down in endless occupations. Those experiences convinced me that “you can’t win without boots on the ground and a full scale ground invasion” was the hard lesson of modern conflict. I got away from my original air and naval power theory roots, the ones drilled into me from the masters: Alfred Thayer Mahan’s strategic tenets of sea power, Curtis LeMay’s overwhelming strategic bombing, John Boyd’s OODA loop dominance, and John Warden’s five-ring targeting that collapses enemy systems from the center out. I let the quagmires cloud my judgment.
When President Trump and our Israeli allies launched this air and naval campaign on February 28—no invasion, no occupation force—I started cautious. Tactical success? Sure, we’d hammer their missiles, navy, and nuclear sites. But regime change? Toppling the mullahs without American divisions in Tehran? I pegged full strategic victory at maybe 20–30%. The regime had survived everything for 47 years. Their Basij and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp would just crush any uprising.
Then the campaign evolved, and I had to reevaluate the lens I see things through.
The real turning point was the deliberate, ferocious targeting of the Basij—the regime’s internal enforcers, the ones who beat down protests and keep the people in chains. This wasn’t incidental; it is a major phase, gutting their leadership (like Basij commander Major General Gholamreza Soleimani taken out in recent Israeli strikes), checkpoints, compounds, and urban control nodes. When you dismantle the very force that suppresses opposition from the air, you create the vacuum for the Iranian people to rise up. That shifted my assessment hard—overall probability of success, including internal regime collapse without boots, jumped to around 48%. The anti-Basij effort proved you could erode the regime’s domestic grip without a ground invasion.
But there is a serious potential for the powerful addition of limited special operations forces—small teams of Delta, SEALs, Green Berets, and our Israeli partners. Not an invasion force, just dozens to low hundreds of operators potentially training, arming, and coordinating indigenous resistance, feeding targets, and protecting the spark if it ignites. That’s straight out of Boyd and Warden: multiply effects, accelerate the OODA loop for the good guys. If incorporated effectively, my numbers would climb again to about 71%. We wouldn’t just be hoping anymore—we’d be enabling a collapse from within.
And if we incorporate the potential for a limited amphibious operation—like the 31st MEU aboard USS Tripoli seizing and holding Kharg Island (Iran’s oil export lifeline, handling ~90% of their revenue) and possibly key islands in the Strait of Hormuz—the math gets even stronger. These moves would deliver crushing economic strangulation overnight: no hard currency, no pay for IRGC/Basij goons, accelerated hardship and defections. It fits perfectly—no mainland occupation, just key terrain denial that starves the beast and removes the threat to the global economy. If executed, it would push the overall probability of full strategic success—military objectives plus regime change from within—into the 78–88% range, central estimate around 83%. That’s LeMay-level decisive, Warden-style systemic collapse, and Mahan’s primary role of the Navy of protecting commerce in real life, without repeating the mistakes of Iraq or Afghanistan.
We are seeing air and naval power, executed with precision and potentially integrated with surgical SOF, prove the skeptics wrong—including this old bomber commander who started out doubting. The mullahs are bleeding leadership, control, and potentially cash. The Iranian people are smelling freedom. And we’re doing it without a trillion-dollar quagmire or American boots marching across Iran.
This operation is correcting the book on warfare. It’s validating the airpower and naval power theories I drifted from after the disastrous ground wars. Curtis LeMay would recognize the overwhelming force. John Boyd would applaud the tempo and adaptation collapsing the Iranian Mosaic Defense. John Warden would nod at the targeting of leadership, internal security, and economic systems and networks. Mahan would be thrilled at the skillful destruction of the Iranian navy no matter where its vessels are and reestablishment of our naval supremacy anywhere and anytime.
America is winning. Our warriors are executing brilliantly. And the era of “you can’t win without boots on the ground in a full-scale invasion” is being retired—right here, right now.
Let’s stay the course. The Iranian people deserve liberation. Our nation deserves victory. And history will remember this as the moment air and naval power, done right, changed the world.
Rob Maness is a retired U.S. Air Force Colonel, former enlisted EOD technician, bomber squadron commander in combat, a former U.S. Senate candidate, and America First national security voice.
WOW…..Thanks pedro …IMPRESSIVE !
Thanks for posting this – timely!!